

1 DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT
2 Department of Industrial Relations
3 State of California
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BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

10	AMERICAN FIRST RUN dba AMERICAN)	No. TAC 32-95
11	FIRST RUN STUDIOS, MAX KELLER,)	
12	MICHELINE KELLER,)	
13)	CERTIFICATION OF LACK OF
14	Petitioners,)	CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE
15)	MEANING OF LABOR CODE
16	vs.)	§1700.44; ORDER DISMISSING
17)	PETITION TO DETERMINE
18	OMNI ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, a)	CONTROVERSY
19	corporation; SHERYL HARDY,)	
20	STEVEN MAIER,)	
21)	
22	Respondents.)	
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29 The above-captioned petition to determine controversy, filed
30 on September 29, 1995, alleges that petitioners AMERICAN FIRST RUN
31 dba AMERICAN FIRST RUN STUDIOS ("AFRS"), MAX KELLER and MICHELINE
32 KELLER sought to produce a television series based on the story of
33 Tarzan, having had obtained a license from the estate of the late
34 Edgar Rice Burroughs to produce such a series; that as producers,
35 petitioners are "artists" within the meaning of Labor Code
36 §1700.4; that petitioners entered into a contract with respondents
37 OMNI ENTERTAINMENT GROUP ("OMNI"), SHERYL HARDY, and later, STEVE
38 MAIER, under which respondents were to raise money for petitioners
39 by locating investors for the production of this television

1 series, for which respondents were to receive a percentage of the
2 amounts paid to AFRS for its production services; that in
3 performing these services, OMNI, HARDY and MAIER acted as "talent
4 agents" within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.4; that none of the
5 respondents have been licensed by the State Labor Commissioner as
6 talent agents at any time relevant herein; and that a dispute
7 subsequently arose between the parties that led to the filing of a
8 lawsuit by HARDY and MAIER against AFRS and the KELLERS for
9 amounts allegedly owed pursuant to the parties' agreement.
10 Petitioners contend, as a defense to the lawsuit and in these
11 proceedings, that by acting as talent agents without having been
12 licensed, respondents violated Labor Code §1700.5 and hence, are
13 not entitled to payment of any amounts purportedly due under the
14 agreement. In this proceeding, petitioners seek a determination
15 that respondents violated Labor Code §1700.5, and an order
16 (1) declaring the agreement to be void ab initio;
17 (2) denying respondents the right to recover any amounts
18 purportedly owed thereunder, and (3) requiring respondents to
19 reimburse petitioners for any amounts that have been paid to
20 respondents under this agreement.

21 Respondents filed an answer along with a motion to dismiss
22 the petition for lack of jurisdiction, contending that as a matter
23 of law, the allegations set forth in the petition do not establish
24 any violation of Labor Code §1700.5. Specifically, respondents
25 contend that petitioners, as potential producers of a television
26 series, are not "artists" within the meaning of Labor Code
27 §1700.4; that respondents, by attempting to locate sources of
28 funding for the proposed television series, are not "talent

1 agents" within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.4; that the
2 parties' agreement is therefore not subject to the provisions of
3 the Talent Agencies Act (Labor Code sections 1700, et seq.); and
4 that since there is no controversy arising under the Talent
5 Agencies Act, the petition must be dismissed by the Labor
6 Commissioner for lack of jurisdiction.

7 Petitioners filed responsive papers in opposition to the
8 motion to dismiss, arguing that a production company was found to
9 be an "artist" under Labor Code §1700.4 in the recent case of
10 Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th
11 246; that since the purpose of respondents' fund raising efforts
12 was to enable petitioners to obtain work as the producers of the
13 Tarzan television series, respondents were acting as talent agents
14 within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.4; and therefore, that the
15 parties' agreement is subject to the Talent Agencies Act and that
16 this controversy is properly before the Labor Commissioner.

17 Labor Code section 1700.44 vests the Labor Commissioner with
18 exclusive primary jurisdiction "in cases of controversy arising
19 under [the Talent Agencies Act]". The Act governs the
20 relationship between artists and talent agencies. The term
21 "talent agency" is defined at Labor Code §1700.4(a) as "a person
22 or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring,
23 offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
24 engagements for an artist or artists". The term "artists" is
25 defined at section 1700.4(b) as:

26 "actors or actresses rendering services on the
27 legitimate stage and in the production of
28 motion pictures, radio artists, musical
 artists, musical organizations, directors of
 legitimate stage, motion pictures, and radio

1 productions, musical directors, writers,
2 cinematographers, composers, lyricists,
3 arrangers, models, and other artists and
4 persons rendering professional services in
5 motion picture, theatrical, radio, television,
6 and other entertainment enterprises."

7 Labor Code §1700.5 provides that "no person shall engage in
8 or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first
9 procuring a license thereof from the Labor Commissioner". A
10 person engages in the occupation of a talent agency by "procuring,
11 offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
12 engagements for an artist or artists". Any agreement between an
13 unlicensed talent agent and an artist is unlawful and void ab
14 initio, and the unlicensed talent agent has no right to recover
15 compensation purportedly due under such an agreement. Buchwald v.
16 Superior Court (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 347.

17 The question of whether the instant controversy "arises
18 under" the Talent Agencies Act turns both on (1) whether
19 petitioners, as the aspiring producers of the Tarzan television
20 series, come within the definition of "artists" at Labor Code
21 §1700.4, and (2) whether respondents, in connection with the fund
22 raising services they were to provide to the petitioners under the
23 parties' agreement, come within the Act's definition of "talent
24 agents". In order for this controversy to "arise under" the Act,
25 both of these questions must be answered affirmatively.

26 Although Labor Code §1700.4(b) does not expressly list
27 producers or production companies as a category within the
28 definition of "artist", the broadly worded definition includes
"other artists and persons rendering professional services in ...
television and other entertainment enterprises". Despite this

1 seemingly open ended formulation, we believe the Legislature
2 intended to limit the term "artists" to those individuals who
3 perform creative services in connection with an entertainment
4 enterprise. Without such a limitation, virtually every "person
5 rendering professional services" connected with an entertainment
6 project - - including the production company's accountants,
7 lawyers and studio teachers - - would fall within the definition
8 of "artists". We do not believe the Legislature intended such a
9 radically far reaching result. This is not to say, of course,
10 that a producer or production company can never be an "artist"
11 under the Act; but only that in order to qualify as an "artist",
12 there must be some showing that the producer's services are
13 artistic or creative in nature, as opposed to services of an
14 exclusively business or managerial nature. Here, petitioners have
15 failed to establish or even allege that as producers they
16 performed any creative services.

17 Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions did not hold that a
18 producer or production company must qualify as "artist" under the
19 Act. Defendants therein, in addition to producing various
20 television projects, also specialized in the design and creation
21 of puppets for use in the entertainment industry and advertising
22 media. The decision is silent as to whether, in their capacity as
23 television producers, defendants were engaged in providing
24 creative services beyond any role as business persons and
25 managers. In short, there is no explanation of the basis upon
26 which the court reached the conclusion that Peppercorn was an
27 "artist" under the Act, nor does it appear that this was even
28 raised as an issue before the court. (At footnote 5 in the

1 decision, the court notes "in this case, there is no dispute that
2 defendants qualify as artists under the Act.") Thus, Peppercorn
3 is not dispositive on this issue.


4 We are unaware of any Labor Commissioner determination or
5 ruling that production companies or producers engaged in fund
6 raising and other business operations of a non-creative,
7 managerial nature are "artists" within the meaning of the Act.
8 That is not surprising, as the purpose of the Act is to protect
9 those seeking artistic and creative employment, not the protection
10 of the business executive or business enterprise that does the
11 hiring.

12 Once it is determined that petitioners were not "artists"
13 within the meaning of the Act, it follows that respondents could
14 not be "talent agents" since a talent agency is defined by its
15 role in procuring employment or engagements "for an artist or
16 artists". Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence that
17 respondents were engaged to procure or attempt to procure any sort
18 of employment for petitioners. AFRS and the KELLERS were not
19 seeking employment with a studio or other production company; they
20 were looking for outside investors to invest in their production
21 company so that they could produce a television series for which
22 they already owned the production rights. The purpose of
23 respondents' efforts to locate "co-producers" was not to obtain
24 "employment" for petitioners, but rather to obtain funds so as to
25 allow a business enterprise and its executives to realize their
26 goal of producing a television series. It is simply ludicrous to
27 suggest that in order for respondents to engage in fund raising
28 activities on behalf of a production company, they must be

1 licensed as a talent agency by the State Labor Commissioner. We
2 do not believe the Legislature intended to revolutionize the
3 entertainment industry by requiring the licensing of all
4 individuals engaged in raising funds for entertainment
5 productions, or to dramatically expand the role of the Labor
6 Commissioner to function as the arbiter of all business disputes
7 that might arise in the course of financing entertainment deals.

8 We therefore find that the parties' agreement is not subject
9 to the provisions of the Talent Agencies Act, and that the
10 controversy as to amounts purportedly due under this agreement
11 does not "arise under" the Act. Consequently, the Labor
12 Commissioner is without jurisdiction to hear or decide the merits
13 of this controversy, and this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

14 DATE: 4/8/96

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